Draft: 3/28/2017
Source: readings and my trading activities
All these happened last week, I was too busy with my work to blog. Finally got some time to pen down my thoughts and recent activities after getting a day off.
Ascott Trust Rights issue (CFIR)
It is rather difficult to find its trading code on SGX. Not even mentioned in its Offer document.
Here is trade summary of its Mar-20’s trade against its underline instrument, I captured during one night via an online trade platform which I seldom used. I couldn’t do it with my POEMS account, not sure why.
CFIR
Last Done Price
|
0.159
|
Volume
|
5,068,500
| ||
Change
|
0.024
|
%Change
|
17.78%
| ||
High
|
0.162
|
Low
|
0.132
| ||
Others* : off-market transaction
| |||||
Price
|
Trades
|
Volume
|
Sold to Buyer
|
Bought from Seller
|
*Other
|
0.132
|
1
|
3,400
|
3,400
|
0
|
0
|
0.133
|
32
|
751,300
|
625,300
|
126,000
|
0
|
0.134
|
86
|
709,400
|
481,700
|
219,800
|
7,900
|
0.135
|
73
|
581,600
|
388,900
|
157,500
|
35,200
|
0.136
|
49
|
411,000
|
249,100
|
106,100
|
55,800
|
0.137
|
35
|
231,900
|
20,200
|
145,900
|
65,800
|
0.138
|
16
|
111,600
|
36,000
|
58,800
|
16,800
|
0.139
|
13
|
74,500
|
5,100
|
57,400
|
12,000
|
0.14
|
9
|
70,200
|
5,000
|
65,200
|
0
|
0.141
|
1
|
4,300
|
4,300
|
0
|
0
|
0.142
|
32
|
80,900
|
28,100
|
52,800
|
0
|
0.143
|
8
|
7,900
|
1,100
|
6,800
|
0
|
0.144
|
6
|
1,400
|
0
|
1,400
|
0
|
0.145
|
5
|
60,200
|
0
|
60,200
|
0
|
0.147
|
6
|
60,000
|
0
|
60,000
|
0
|
0.148
|
11
|
43,900
|
29,100
|
12,300
|
2,500
|
0.149
|
2
|
4,600
|
1,400
|
0
|
3,200
|
0.15
|
21
|
113,900
|
75,800
|
38,100
|
0
|
0.151
|
6
|
51,400
|
0
|
7,000
|
44,400
|
0.152
|
8
|
97,600
|
40,300
|
57,300
|
0
|
0.153
|
13
|
89,900
|
60,900
|
25,700
|
3,300
|
0.154
|
12
|
190,700
|
83,000
|
107,700
|
0
|
0.155
|
4
|
59,800
|
1,400
|
0
|
58,400
|
0.156
|
19
|
160,300
|
125,400
|
34,900
|
0
|
0.157
|
12
|
273,200
|
73,200
|
200,000
|
0
|
0.158
|
55
|
357,600
|
260,500
|
81,900
|
15,200
|
0.159
|
38
|
253,400
|
186,000
|
64,100
|
3,300
|
0.16
|
22
|
105,000
|
56,000
|
22,400
|
26,600
|
0.161
|
22
|
42,600
|
27,000
|
15,600
|
0
|
0.162
|
5
|
65,000
|
0
|
65,000
|
0
|
TOTAL:
|
622
|
5,068,500
|
2,868,200
|
1,849,900
|
350,400
|
Avg Vol/Trade
|
8,149
| ||||
Avg Trade($)
|
$1,167.70
| ||||
Avg Price($)
|
0.143
|
(Don’t understand what is off-market transaction)
A68U
Last Done Price
|
1.08
|
Volume
|
8,536,800
| |
Change
|
0.025
|
%Change
|
2.37%
| |
High
|
1.09
|
Low
|
1.06
| |
Price
|
Trades
|
Volume
|
Sold to Buyer
|
Bought from Seller
|
1.06
|
317
|
765,100
|
765,100
|
0
|
1.065
|
545
|
3,798,400
|
1,138,800
|
2,659,600
|
1.07
|
189
|
974,600
|
3,500
|
971,100
|
1.075
|
106
|
624,400
|
362,400
|
262,000
|
1.08
|
592
|
1,694,400
|
842,500
|
851,900
|
1.085
|
155
|
679,800
|
106,000
|
573,800
|
1.09
|
1
|
100
|
0
|
100
|
TOTAL:
|
1,905
|
8,536,800
|
3,218,300
|
5,318,500
|
With 481milion new units rights issued, considering Sponsor(Ascott) and few key investors committed to subscribe to the new Units, they are unlikely to trade Rights on the bourse, so the % of eligible rights owner changing hands is higher. A good observation over the following few days is, specially when Ascott announced its financial results, Rights issue could be up/down more volatile in a single trading day due to its leverage. For 1 right @~0.14-~0.15, and offer price of 0.919, it is ~6time leverage, meaning every 1% movement of Ascott, could bring 6 times of % change to its rights price. I believe a lot of traders are gonna like this: 17.78% in a day.
Kimly(1D0)
It is sizzling hot for this coffee shop counter. Not unexpected.
Here is its first day debut performance on Mar 20th, 2017.
Last Done Price
|
0.44
|
Volume
|
108,499,100
| ||
Change
|
-
|
%Change
|
-
| ||
High
|
0.565
|
Low
|
0.425
| ||
Others* : off-market transaction
| |||||
Price
|
Trades
|
Volume
|
Sold to Buyer
|
Bought from Seller
|
*Other
|
0.425
|
33
|
777,000
|
777,000
|
0
|
0
|
0.43
|
91
|
2,664,900
|
2,231,400
|
433,500
|
0
|
0.435
|
247
|
5,028,100
|
2,306,700
|
2,721,400
|
0
|
0.44
|
216
|
4,175,400
|
2,350,000
|
1,825,400
|
0
|
0.445
|
230
|
5,964,900
|
2,795,600
|
3,169,300
|
0
|
0.45
|
571
|
10,228,800
|
5,263,200
|
4,884,100
|
81,500
|
0.455
|
446
|
8,613,900
|
3,541,700
|
5,072,200
|
0
|
0.46
|
284
|
6,122,100
|
2,669,800
|
3,452,300
|
0
|
0.465
|
124
|
2,150,900
|
1,362,300
|
788,600
|
0
|
0.47
|
162
|
3,438,800
|
1,128,600
|
2,310,200
|
0
|
0.475
|
127
|
3,118,300
|
1,178,300
|
1,940,000
|
0
|
0.48
|
155
|
3,315,500
|
2,016,300
|
1,299,200
|
0
|
0.485
|
152
|
2,910,300
|
1,467,300
|
1,379,500
|
63,500
|
0.49
|
99
|
1,678,800
|
691,500
|
884,100
|
103,200
|
0.495
|
29
|
1,220,700
|
761,100
|
459,600
|
0
|
0.5
|
100
|
2,151,600
|
2,006,500
|
145,100
|
0
|
0.505
|
147
|
3,028,400
|
1,838,100
|
1,190,300
|
0
|
0.51
|
107
|
2,059,500
|
550,300
|
1,509,200
|
0
|
0.515
|
77
|
2,324,900
|
1,840,100
|
484,800
|
0
|
0.52
|
68
|
1,957,600
|
754,200
|
1,203,400
|
0
|
0.525
|
64
|
1,257,600
|
1,207,000
|
50,600
|
0
|
0.53
|
74
|
1,407,400
|
542,700
|
864,700
|
0
|
0.535
|
130
|
2,619,100
|
1,961,000
|
658,100
|
0
|
0.54
|
125
|
2,083,200
|
1,276,400
|
499,100
|
307,700
|
0.545
|
200
|
4,960,000
|
3,529,600
|
1,430,400
|
0
|
0.55
|
555
|
17,871,300
|
15,118,600
|
2,707,900
|
44,800
|
0.555
|
110
|
3,271,300
|
1,182,300
|
1,866,000
|
223,000
|
0.56
|
72
|
1,919,200
|
473,400
|
1,076,200
|
369,600
|
0.565
|
1
|
179,600
|
0
|
179,600
|
0
|
TOTAL:
|
4,796
|
108,499,100
|
62,821,000
|
44,484,800
|
1,193,300
|
Avg Vol/Trade
|
22,623
| ||||
Avg Trade($)
|
$11,123.44
| ||||
Avg Price($)
|
0.492
|
In the end, I turned sideline to become an observer for the entire week, partly because I have no spare time during the day last week to check its price movement. So it is not my money when it hit a bottom price of $0.42~$0.43.
While I could claim that if I could have purchased Kimly at $0.42 and sold it $0.50, it is illusive from a back-view mirror point, unless I consider Kimly's value is more than that.
While I could claim that if I could have purchased Kimly at $0.42 and sold it $0.50, it is illusive from a back-view mirror point, unless I consider Kimly's value is more than that.
Super Group
I tendered my consent form for accepting Super Group’s voluntary acquisition proposal. The price offered is S$1.30 in cash by JDE(Jacobs Douwe Egberts BV) unconditionally, valued Super Group at S$1.45b. The delisting from SGX will take place if after JDE acquires more than 90% shares. Offer was planned btwn Mar 14th to Apr 11th, but extended to Apr 25th.(Is it because acquirer would like to make certain of collecting enough shares?)
Quote from its announcement:
“As of 5pm yesterday, shares of Super Group that are owned, controlled or agreed to be acquired by Sapphire Investments stood at 872,408,213, representing 78.29% of Super Groups shares.”
Super was traded at S$0.97/piece just before its trading halt on Oct 31st, 2016. I got to know this news when I was still in China, planning for my moving back to SG.
The trading halt was lifted on Nov 3rd when the price of the counter shot up to 1.2x. After knowing that founding family and Mr. Sam Goi gave their irrevocable undertakings to accept the offer, and JDE paid more than $10m as a goodfaith deposit, I got in at 1.25~1.26.
Here was my thought:
If it took a year to complete the transaction, I’m going to get an annualized return of 3.2%, any date earlier will improve the RR. Downside is almost nil.
Fast forward, 5mth later:
Current calculation, assuming close at end of April: XIRR=~6.6%.
Nothing spectacular, but this is my money I could reliably estimate when I got in, very little dependency on the general market movement when looked back in Nov 2016.
An important lesson I learnt thru these number of years is: we don't play retrospective games in investment.
An important lesson I learnt thru these number of years is: we don't play retrospective games in investment.
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