Showing posts with label Quick Assessment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Quick Assessment. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 8, 2017

Centurion(OU8)

Draft: 3/8/2017, Price: 0.39, Market cap: $289m.
Source: 2016 unaudited FR and presentation

Updated: 3/9/2017
=================================
Business: Own, develop and manage worker and student accommodation in SG, MY, AU and UK.
(some legacy optical disc business, can be ignored due to insignificant biz vol)

2016('000) Worker Student
Segment Rev 85,824 32,276
Segment Profit 47,927 11,716
56% 36%

Company is controlled by Mr. David Loh Kim Kang(age: 54) with 55% stake, who was former head of UOB Kay Hian dealer team. Public listed company Lian Beng also holds 5%.

Statistics:
22 dormitories, 63k beds(60k workers, 3k students), pipeline 12.7k more beds.

Growth strategy: continuous expansion by acquiring new accommodation assets.
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F Capacity(# of beds)
5,300 13,900 19,700 23,500 27,600 34,700 34,700 34,700 34,700 SG
10,900 13,500 14,500 19,800 25,300 25,300 38,000 38,000 MY
456 456 456 456 456 456 AU
1,906 1,901 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420 UK
315 332 332 332 332 SG(stu)
5,300 24,800 33,200 40,362 50,072 63,208 63,208 75,908 75,908 Total

Demand & Supply:
Foreign worker(excl. domestic helpers) in SG: 2016: 798600; 2015: 789300.
In SG: +57000 new beds, and 28000 beds expired in 2016

=================================
Track records

=================================
Assessment
Since the game of the past is to grow business by, utilizing different financial instruments, invest/inject new accommodation assets into the company, such as: MTN(multi currency term notes/some kinds of bond?), it is obvious that each year we will see revenue and profit growth in financial reports, so make judgement purely based on revenue and profit's annual absolute figures will lead to growth stock impression, this is however not very appropriate. <This indeed seems much aligned with Mr. David Loh's dealer background on financial leveraging, but why would he in the first place have invested heavily into such an industry which doesn't offer kind of "siok" feeling, puzzle to me>

The best way to gauge its operation efficiency is to compare each year's ROIC, but as a retail investor unless I'm willing to do it myself by sieving thru the reports, else without such info at hand, I can try out this quick and non elegant way:
 (caveat:  not all beds are equal, and new additions are not always committed beginning of the year)
I got the followings:
2,011 2,012 2,013 2,014 2,015 2,016
Rev per bed per mth 204 126 119 158 166 156
Prof per bed per mth 85 46 49 62 59 51
SG GDP growth 7.5% 4.2% 4.8% 3.1% 4.5% 0.5%


With lower revenue from student dormitory than that of workers', it is likely that future NP% will further go south.












=================================
SG GDP info from http://www.singstat.gov.sg

=================================
My plan
One of well known SG bloggers ASSI added a position of Centurion recently. He did that based on his estimation of dividend record and potential, as well as the pattern shown in TA chart.

Although I regretted of missing to add this counter when Mr. David Loh purchased some more shares at 0.30~0.325 from end of 2016 to beginning of 2017 when Centurion price plunged,
For now at 0.39 a piece, I'd rather prefer to stay at side line though, for I feel it is right priced now for a  business that will generally flow in line w/ SG/MY economy growth. One has to get satisfied with the current yield in order to invest.

From its presentation, 2018, 2019 foretasted beds capacity stays the same, a plateau reached by Centurion is that unless SG/MY economy is growing much faster than projection, adding more workers' beds will only cause high financial leverage on balance sheet but lower utilization in operation; while strategy of venturing into students' beds have a lower margin contribution than that of workers' segment. Centurion currently lacks of an'exciting" factor.

Knowing of Mr. David Loh's background, how he will further improve his position could be a good learning lesson for me.

=================================
Tabloid time
Mr. David Loh married to Race Wong (a HK celebrity) recently. 财子配佳人。

Monday, March 6, 2017

Tat Seng Pkg(T12)

Draft: 3/6/2017 (Price: $0.52, market value: $81m)
Data source: IPO Prospectus, 2005 company announcement, 2016 unaudited FR,

Business: manufacture and sale of corrugated cardboards.
==================================
History
Then
2001, production capacity SG: 14,868 tonnes, CN: 20,895.
Controlled by Mr Low See Pong(45%) and Loh See Moon(15%)
IPO: 0.21/share, 39,300,000 shares(new), 157,200,000(total)
NAV: 24.5cents
EPS: 3.63cents
Inventory turnover: 115d, 107, 87 for FY1999, 2000,2001.

A family business started in 1960+, directors & key executives are all relatives.
300+ employees
$'000 1999 2000 2001
Turnover          20,610          27,776          33,505
PBT            3,329            3,789            5,097
16% 14% 15%
SG 79.70% 59.80% 52%
PRC 20.30% 40.20% 48%

Later
Acquired by PSC, Mr. Allan Yap in 2005.
79,820,000 ordinary shares of total S$16,961,750 (based on S$0.2125/share) and  is  arrived  at  on  a  willing  buyer  and  willing  seller  basis, at 7.61% discount at prevailing $0.23 price on Oct 2005. ~50.78% of the entire share capital.

Now
million 2006-12 2007-12 2008-12 2009-12 2010-12 2011-12 2012-12 2013-12 2014-12 2015-12 2016-12
Revenue 55 75 96 113 153 167 180 216 225 231 228
GP% 20.0% 17.2% 16.6% 21.8% 17.5% 15.4% 19.4% 20.3% 20.2% 21.1% 22.6%
OP 3 6 4 10 9 7 11 17 16 19 17
OP% 4.9% 8.2% 4.6% 9.0% 6.0% 4.2% 6.1% 8.1% 7.1% 8.2% 7.5%
NP 2 6 3 7 6 4 8 12 9 12 14
Operating CF 5 2 -4 5 10 2 9 11 11 33 24
CAPEX -1 -5 -2 -2 -7 -5 -10 -11 -9 -7 -9
FCF 4 -3 -6 4 3 -3 -1 2 26 15
EPS/share($) 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.09
NAV/share($) 0.3 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.46 0.51 0.6 0.66

==================================
Risks
Barrier to enter corrugated paper packaging is rather low.
Environmental pollution control: the production process causes storage and usage of hazardous substances.

Sunday, February 26, 2017

SingPost (S08)

Draft: 2/14/2017

Source: SingPost Q3 report.

Updated: 2/26/2017, Market size:3.16b, PB 1.9, Price $1.39/share

Another blog by ASSI attractive my interest. Alright, in fact I bought SingPost some time ago; and received an email from my broker on Monday when SingPost's price dropped by 6% after its over-the-weekend profit warning announcement.

eCommerce acquisition: TradeGlobal in Nov 2015 is a flop, merely a year more, mgmt is talking about impairment of that whole acquisition.

Who made that corporate purchase decision? How can it be in this short period of time, two key customers of TradeGlobal one filed for Ch 11, the other went for in-source.


==============================
What does Alibaba value SingPost
- Alibaba invested $86.2m on Oct 27, 2016 for 34% stake in Quantium Solutions. Value QS at S$254m. QS revenue Q3 16/17 is 29.5m; Singpost Logistics segment Q3 16/17 is 171.3m(OP 5%); Singpost Q3 16/17 revenue: 369m(OP 10%).
=> SingPost: ~3.1b
- Alibaba  invested $187.1m on Jan 11, 2017 for 4.2% of SingPost($1.74/share)
=>SingPost: ~4.4b
- Alibaba invested $312.5m for 10.35% of SingPost by Jul 2014.
=>SingPost: ~3b

==============================
Value Catalyst
Only when Tradeglobal stops bleeding.

==============================
Turn around plan
Entry price not attractive, average down.

Sunday, February 12, 2017

Frasers Logistics & Industrial Trust(BUOU)

Draft: 2/4/2017 (Market size: 1.355b, PB: 1.124; 1.43b units)

Updated:2/13/2017

While reading some online blog's recent article, I notice this post from ASSI, one of the well-known financially independent bloggers, on Frasers Logistics & Industrial Trust(FLT). His entry price is 92.5c.

I decided to take a look myself.

FLT IPO in Jun 2016, 850-page prospectus can be found here. Invest mainly in industrial properties in Australia. IPO price 0.89/unit. (1A$=1.01S$), market cap of S$1.27b at IPO list price.
Listing expense S$29m.

================
AU GDP expected grow 4.9% from 2014 to 2016(2.7% p.a till 2020),with AU$50b commitment on "Infrastructure Growth Pkg". AU Interest rate 1.75% in 05/2016.

Sponsor: FCL.
51 properties(and another 3 call-option properties), S$1.6billion, 1.16m sqm under mgmt. 98.3% occupancy, 68 tenants(profile, consumer companies and e-comm biz). 60% freehold, 30.2% for at least 80y leases. (=>A$1400/sqm)
WALE: weighted average lease expiry. (6.9years)
NPI: Net Property Income(A$107.9m)
GLA: gross lettable area.
ROFR: right of first refusal
FPA: Frasers Property Australia. (90years in Australia), offers free rental and fit out allowances to tenants in 14 properties.
AEI: Asset Enhancement Initiative.
HAUT: head Australian trust(FLT Australia Trust)
MIT: managed investment trust
Considered as ALT(Australia Land Trust)


Demand & Supply:
Pg 47/850 states: approx. 1.3m sqm of new supply completed in 2015, more than 20% below the 10-y annual average of 1.7m... occupier take-up 2.3m sqm in 2015, above 10-y average at 2m sqm.
<details on Pg 236/Pg 727>

Competition:
Pg 237: Goodman group, Charter Hall, Dexus, 360 Capital <FLT ranks 4th>
SREITs: Ascendas REIT(yield 6.02%), Mapletree logistics trust, AIMS AMP Capital Ind. REIT, Cache logistics trust.

Typical lease term in AU:


Existing buildings  Development lease  Speculative construction
Typical lease term (years)  3 to 5 years  10 to 20 years  5 to 10 years
Typical rental escalation p.a.  3.0% to 3.5%  2.75% to 3.5%  3.0% to 3.5%
Typical incentive (new lease) 5% up to 30%  10% up to 30%  10% up to 35%
Growth potential: organic growth 3.2%(2.5~3.75%) annual rental increments; inorganic: ROFR assets(147k sqm) from Sponsor.

47.3% of rental income from top 10 tenants, largest being with Coles(supermarket),15.6%.
<Risk factor: subject to the risk of loss of anchor tenants, non-renewal, non-replacement or early termination of leases>
Pg 699: Closure of Ford, Toyota and GM plants in 2017 will have negative impact (1m sqm) to AU L&I rental market (Melbourne and Adelaide), impacting 8.2% of FLT's portfolio income, if counting other tyre, parts companies' usage. (Risk of significant vacancy with car manufacturing closure)

Distribution policy: 100% attributable income for 2016, 2017; 90% thereafter.
================
REIT mgr fee: 0.4% per annum of deposited property value (S$6m+)
Performance fee: 5% per annum of distributable income of FLT. (S$4m+)
REIT trustee(Perpetual (Asia) Ltd) 's fee: 0.015% per annum of deposited property value
Property mgmt fee and Lease mgmt fee: 1.2% per annum of NPI
(from pg 76, complicated reason is explained on Pg 77 of formation of HAUT)

================

Pro Forma P/L

FY2013(A$'000)
FY2014(A$'000)
FY2015(A$'000)
Gross revenue 100,726
100,992
111,023
Property Op Ex -15,584
-17,534
-18,721
Net Property Income 85,142 84.5% 83,458 82.6% 92,302 83.1%
REIT Mgr's mgt fee -7,788 7.7% -7,966 7.9% -8,736 7.9%
Trustees’ fees -161 0.2% -171 0.2% -181 0.2%
Other trust expense -12,864 12.8% -2,400 2.4% -3,716 3.3%
Finance cost

-4,050
Fair value adj to investment property -36,167
-10,883
-14,275
Total return for the period bef tax 28,162 28.0% 62,038 61.4% 61,344 55.3%
Tax -9,658 34.3% -9,586 15.5% -10,830 17.7%
Total return after Tax 18,504 18.4% 52,452 51.9% 50,514 45.5%
Other adjustments 50,660
15,836
21,381
Income available to Unitholders 69,164 68.7% 68,288 67.6% 71,895 64.8%

(AU tax rate: company 30%, trust 47%)
<due to straightline account, rental income adjustment will cause gross rental incoming reported in FR to be reduced each year? only if can be offset by addition of new tenancy>

B/S

As Dec 2015(A$'000)
Investment properties 1,604,039
Other non-current assets 7,650
Total non-current assets 1,611,689 97.3%
Cash/equivalents 36,879
Other current assets 7,319
Total current assets 44,198 2.7%
Total 1,655,887 100.0%



Total Current liabilities 6,757 0.4%
Other non-current payables 7,650
Borrowings 418,200
Total non-current liabilities 425,850 25.7%
Total liabilities 432,607 26.1%
Net assets to Unitholders  1,223,280 73.9%
 (other non-current assets, other current assets are from FPA under incentive reimbursement arrangement)

CFO(2015), 73.9m A$. Net cash generated from op(after tax): 67m A$.

IPO proceeds used for:
  • consideration for the purchase of the IPO properties
  • payment for related acquisition cost, issuance cost
  • working capital
 (2.7% premium over NAV when listed)

Pg 200 (projected 2017 income, I don't understand why add back fair value, mgmt fee, deferred tax)

Auditor: Ernst & Young LLP.
Valuers: Savills Valuations Pty Ltd, Urbis Valuations Pty Ltd.
<in the valuation reports annex-E, pg 515/Savills: Discount rate 8.25% is used, with majority of properties valued having an IRR of 8.xx%; pg 637/Urbis: DR 7.75%, with IRR of 7.xx%>

================
S-REITs regulation: 45% aggregate leverage. = total borrowings (including deferred payments for assets) to the value of the Deposited Property.

================
Frasers is controlled by TCC group, whose chairman is Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi who owns ThaiBev.

================
Throughout the reading of prospectus, I notice a lot of acronyms, is that fashionable for Investment banker to draft their docs in mountains of acronyms? It is just such a headache for readers.

A lot of duplicated info in the prospectus, does IB feel guilty of getting paid way too much that is why the doc is stuffed with unnecessary duplication?

After reading the prospectus, I have the impression that Trust of such(in that matter any S-REITs) has to pay various fees to so called "manager" or mgmt for the formation of such Trust. Even for divestment of property, quote a hypothetical case, if FLT sells a property due to poor performance because of its initial wrong judgement, REIT mgr still collects money for such buy and sell 'round-trip' transaction, whereas unit holders suffer economically due to "internal transaction(friction) cost" after as-if-non-existent transaction.

================
 Quoted from prospectus:
"As an investment in a REIT is meant to produce returns over the long-term, investors should not
expect to obtain short-term gains.


================
Valuation
Based on Trust Deed, unit holder cannot demand transfer of Deposited Properties from REIT mgr, meaning the underlying assets value has no direct impact to secondary market investor, the pecuniary gain can only be from, other than the usual unit price fluctuation, the distributable rental income. This is illustrated by JLL's top10 competition analysis table, too.
FLT has only BS(rental income) as investment vehicle.  (Pg 777/778)

Two questions:
- Is the current yield attractive to the investor?
- Is the current rental income sustainable and expected growth attractive to the investor?

The beauty is in the eyes of byholder. I decided to buy and hold a small position, not so much of the answers to the above, but I'd like to initial some AU exposure at an acceptable price.

Anyway, go with GIC should not be too wrong.


Australia.